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INTRODUCTION

Complying with the complex mandates of the Internal Revenue
Code (I.R.C.) can be an exhilarating exercise in creative statutory
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University, 2013; B.A., University of Mary Washington, 2009. I would like to thank my
family, Michael, Georgiana, and Emily, for pushing me to work harder-from
elementary school vocabulary flash-cards to law school exams-and for sending me to
Wakefield School, The Plains. I need to thank Jessica Case for being there to put up with
the law school time-crunch.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 117:2

interpretation for those who are willing to risk possible penalties.I The
convolution of the code provides opportunities to take advantage of its
provisions, evade taxes, and create complex shelter mechanisms. 2 Tax
evasion went uncontrolled in the 1990s, and the tax shelter industry
boomed. 3 However, the rise of abusive mechanisms prompted response
from both Congress, and the Internal Revenue Service and the U.S.
Department of the Treasury ("Treasury"). 4
The Treasury's primary weapon against tax evaders is its
congressionally delegated power to interpret the I.R.C. through Treasury
Regulations ("TRs").5 Although the standard of deference due to TRs by
the courts has been the subject of academic debate for decades, the U.S.
Supreme Court recently determined that courts are to evaluate TRs with
the same standard of deference applied to most administrative
regulations. 6
In Mayo Foundationfor Medical Education and Research v. United
States,7 the Supreme Court held that TRs are entitled to administrative
deference as set forth in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource
Defense Counsel8 ("Chevron deference"), rather than the less deferential
standard advocated by some tax practitioners. 9 Chevron deference
allows a court to defer to an administrative regulation when Congress has
not "spoken directly to the precise question at issue" and the regulation is
based on a "permissible construction of the statute."' 0 By aligning

1. See Hale E. Sheppard, Only Time Will Tell: The Growing Importance of the
Statute of Limitations in an Era of Sophisticated International Tax Structuring, 30
BROOK. J.INT'L L. 453, 453 (2005).

2. See Derek B. Wagner, Who's the (Son oJ) Boss?: The Struggle Between the
Federal Circuit and Treasury to Define "Omitsfrom Gross Income" in Son of Boss Tax
Shelters and Other Overstatement-of-Basis Tax Cases, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 45, 45 n. 1

(2011).
3. See Matthew Roche, Son of Boss and the Troubling Legacy of Colony, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 58 CATH. U. L. REv. 263, 263 (2008).
4. See id.
5. See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2006); Roche, supra note 3, at 263 (explaining that
Congress enabled the Treasury to promulgate regulations to clarify sections of the I.R.C.
as necessary for enforcement).
6. See Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in
Judicial Deference, 90 MrNN. L. REv. 1537, 1560-63 (2006) (discussing the debate in
scholarship over the level of deference that the courts should give TRs).
7. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 704
(2011).
8. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
9. See Richard Lipton & Russell Young, Courts Split on Validity of Section
6501(e)(1)(A) Regulations After Mayo Foundation, 115 J. TAX'N 21, 28 (2011)
(explaining that Mayo Foundation implicitly overruled Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n v.
United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979), making Chevron the judicial standard for TR
deference).
10. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
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judicial deference standards of TRs to the test established in Chevron, the
Supreme Court indicated that courts are to grant TRs a higher degree of
deference than under the pre-Mayo Foundationregime."
In the wake of Mayo Foundation, several circuits of the U.S. Courts
of Appeals are divided over whether deference was due to new TRs
interpreting I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) ("Section 6501,,).12 The circuit split
demonstrated that Mayo Foundationhas brought tax deference within the
realm of the already problematic Chevron jurisprudence. 13 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve the split over Section 6501 and had its
first opportunity to clearly examine long-standing Chevron problems
through a tax lens. 14
The circuit courts divided over the meaning of Section 6501, a
statute of limitations ("SOL") provision that extends the time under
which the Treasury can recover tax deficiencies from three to six years
when a "taxpayer omitsfrom gross income an amount properly includible
[on their tax return]. ... '1 The circuit courts disagreed whether an
overstatement of basis by the taxpayer is included in the statutory
meaning of "omits from gross income."' 16 Gross income from a sale or
exchange is typically the difference between the taxpayer's basis in an17
item, usually the amount paid, and the amount for which it was sold.
"

11. See generally Carpenter Family Invs., LLC v. Comm'r, 136 T.C. 373, 389
(2011) (discussing the effect of Mayo Foundationon TRjurisprudence).
12. See Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2011); Home Concrete &
Supply, LLC v. United States. 634 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2011), af'd, 132 S.Ct 1836 (2011);
Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Salman Ranch,
Ltd. v. Comm'r (Salman Ranch IV), 647 F.3d 929 (10th Cir. 2011); Intermountain Ins.
Serv. of Vail v. Comm'r, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
13. See Richard Lipton & Russell Young, Treasury Regulations, and the 'Death' of
National Muffler, 114 J. TAX'N 206, 214 (2011) ("IT]he ghost of National Muffler still
may benevolently haunt post-Mayo Foundationcases.").
14. See Carpenter Family Invs., LLC v. Comm'r, 136 T.C. 373, 389-90 (2011);
Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. Feb. 2011),
affd, 132 S. Ct 1836 (2011).
15. I.R.C. § 6501 (2006) (emphasis added). The statute was amended in 2010 by the
Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 513(a)(1),
124 Stat. 1. See Salman Ranch IV, 647 F.3d at 933 n.8. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i-ii), the
gross receipts and adequate disclosure provisions, was moved to I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(B)(iii) to make room for clarification of an unrelated matter. See id In accordance with the
courts discussed in this Comment, references to Section 6501 refer to the 2006 version of
the I.R.C. See id.(noting that courts and parties consistently refer to the pre-amended
version of the Section).
16. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6501(e)-i, 301.6229(c)(2)-1 (as amended by T.D. 9511,
75 Fed. Reg. 78897-01 (Dec. 17, 2010)).
17. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (2006); I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2006) ("Computation of gain or
loss.-The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess of the
amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for
determining gain, and the loss shall be the excess of the adjusted basis provided in such
section for determining loss over the amount realized.").
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Therefore, a taxpayer could reduce his tax liability by either understating
his income or overstating his basis because both would reduce the total
amount of tax liability owed. 18
Although the Supreme Court had interpreted Section 6501 before,
the circuit courts were divided over whether they were bound by the
precedent, or could distinguish it. 19 In 1958, the Supreme Court, in
Colony v. Commissioner,20 held that an overstatement of basis was not
21
included within the definition of "omits from gross income.",
According to the Court, only an understatement of income, not an
overstatement of basis, would extend the SOL from three to six years.2 2
A month before the Supreme Court's 2011 decision in Mayo Foundation,
the Treasury attempted to distinguish Colony by issuing TRs that reinterpreted "omits from gross income" under Section 6501. The
Treasury distinguished Colony, arguing that the case spoke only to
taxpayers who were a "trade or business" engaged in "the sale of goods
or services.
,23 Thus, outside the trade or business context, the statute
was ambiguous, allowing the Treasury to issue interpretive TRs.24
Since then, two circuit courts have held the TRs to be invalid and
have found that Colony controls without exception, applying a three-year
SOL when a taxpayer reduces his tax liability by overstating basis.25
Conversely, three other circuit courts have held that the TRs controls,
thus allowing the Treasury six years to prosecute taxpayer deficiencies
under the section.26 The Supreme Court resolved the split in Home

18. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2006).
19. See generally Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249,
254-55 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussing the circuit split), aff'd, 132 S. Ct 1836 (2011).
20. Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28 (1958).
21. See id. at 36-37.
22. See id.
23. I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) (2006); see Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6501(e)-i,
301.6229(c)(2)-1 (as amended T.D. 9511, 75 Fed. Reg. 78897-01 (Dec. 17, 2010)). The
regulations interpreted both I.R.C. § 6501(e) and I.R.C. § 6229(c). See id. Although the
provisions differ slightly, courts focus on the interpretation of Section 6501 because the
statutes are interdependent. See, e.g., Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States (Salman Ranch
I), 79 Fed. Cl. 189, 193 (2007). Although Section 6501 applies to a "trade or business"
engaged in "the sale of goods or services," this Comment will omit "the sale of goods or
services" language of the reference to comport with courts' treatment of the limitation in
their discussions. See, e.g., Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 254-55 (referring to Section
6501 as applying to a "trade or business" and omitting "the sale of goods or services").
24. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6501(e)-i, 301.6229(c)(2)-1 (as amended T.D. 9511, 75
Fed. Reg. 78897-01 (Dec. 17, 2010)).
25. See Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2011); Home Concrete &
Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2011), affd, 132 S. Ct 1836 (2011).
26. See Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail v. Comm'r, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Salman
Ranch, Ltd. v. Comm'r (Salman Ranch IV), 647 F.3d 929 (10th Cir. 2011); see also
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Concrete & Supply v. United States27 by deciding not to extend the SOL
in any context, holding that Colony resolved the ambiguity and that
overstating basis does not result in "omit[ing] from gross income. 2 s
However, the majority rested its decision on stare decisis rather than
taking the opportunity to resolve a long-standing question in
administrative law: to what extent does the ambiguity determination of a
pre-Chevron decision bind a court determining statutory ambiguity postChevron?
In National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X
Internet Services,29 the Supreme Court held that "[a] court's prior
judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision
holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the
statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion."30 However,
lower courts have applied Brand X inconsistently due to their inability to
determine when a prior court decision made a determination of a
statute's ambiguity.3 1
This Comment will address the failure of Brand X to produce
consistent results in the context of the conflict between Colony and the
Section 6501 TRs. Specifically, this Comment will argue that the recent
circuit split over Section 6501 demonstrates the inability of the courts to
apply Brand X with consistency.32 Part II of this Comment will discuss
the impact of Chevron and Mayo Foundation to TR deference, analyze
the Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 6501 in Colony, and
provide a case, Salmon Ranch v. Commissioner,33 exemplifying the taxevading transactions at issue in Section 6501 cases.

Beard v. Comm'r, 633 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (extending the SOL to six years without
reaching the validity of the Section 6501 TRs).
27. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012).
28. See Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct 1836, 1839 (2011).
29. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967
(2005).
30. Id. at 982.
31. See, e.g., Robin K. Craig, Agencies Interpreting Courts InterpretingStatutes:
The Deference Conundrum of a Divided Supreme Court, 61 EMoRy L.J. 1, 18-24 (2011)
(comparing courts that deferred to agency regulation over precedent to those who did
not).
32. See Administrative Law-Chevron Deference-Federal Tax Court Holds PreChevron Judicial Construction of Statute Precludes Subsequent Agency Interpretation if
PriorConstruction Was Premisedon Legislative History, 124 HARv. L. REv. 1066, 106667 (2011) (using the Section 6501 circuit split to argue for a new BrandX framework).
33. Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. United States (Salman Ranch I), 79 Fed. Cl. 189 (2007);
Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. United States (Salman Ranch II), 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009);
Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Comm'r (Salman Ranch III), No. 13677-08 (T.C. Aug. 7, 2009);
Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Comm'r (Salman Ranch IV), 647 F.3d 929 (10th Cir. 2011).
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Part III will argue that Brand X, the case in which the Supreme
Court attempted to answer the question of when a court is bound by a
pre-Chevron determination of statutory ambiguity, is an important, yet
ambiguous precedent. Indeed, the circuit split over whether a court is
bound by Colony demonstrates3 4 that Brand X is ambiguous, at best, and
cannot be applied consistently.
Finally, Part III posits that courts will only achieve consistency if a
prior determination of statutory ambiguity is consistently construed
narrowly. That is, courts can achieve consistency by distinguishing
judicial precedent in favor of agency regulation when courts attempt to
determine if they are bound by a pre-existing determination of statutory
ambiguity. Such a framework would yield consistent results in lower
courts and be faithful to Chevron's deferential framework." 5

II.

BACKGROUND

The Section 6501 circuit split demonstrated that Brand X, the case
that attempted to answer when a court is bound by a prior determination
of statutory ambiguity, is an unworkable precedent. To understand how
Brand X fits into the circuit split, Section A of this Part will detail the
level of judicial deference due to TRs generally. Section B will examine
Colony, where the Supreme Court made its first determination regarding
statutory ambiguity in Section 6501. Part C will then discuss Salman
Ranch v. Commissioner36 to exemplify the types of transactions that are
at issue in Section 6501 cases and why the Treasury promulgated TRs
interpreting the section differently than the Supreme Court in Colony.
A.

Chevron Deference Prevails in Mayo Foundation

Congress, through the I.R.C., delegates legislative authority to the
Treasury to promulgate rules in varied forms. 37 However, the precise
level of deference has been at issue for years.38
34. See infra Parts III.B-C.
35. See infraPart III.E.
36. Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. United States (Salman Ranch I), 79 Fed. Cl. 189 (2007);
Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. United States (Salman Ranch II), 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009);
Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Comm'r (Salman Ranch III), No. 13677-08 (T.C. Aug. 7, 2009);
Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Comm'r (Salman Ranch IV), 647 F.3d 929 (10th Cir. 2011).
37. See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2000); see generally Donald L. Korb, The Four R's
Revisited: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance, and Retroactivity in the 21st century: A View
from Within Mitchell Rogovin (1931-1996) Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service
1965-1966, 46 DUQ. L. REv. 323, 326 (2008) (discussing the Treasury's varied types of
regulations and the authority under which they are promulgated).
38. See Andrew Pruitt, JudicialDeference of Retroactive Interpretative Treasury
Regulations, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1558, 1575 (2011) (describing judicial deference
case law as confusing and unresolved).
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In 1979, the Supreme Court examined the proper deference that
courts should apply to TRs in National Muffler Dealers Association v.
United States.39 The Court held: "In determining whether a particular
regulation carries out the congressional mandate in a proper manner, we
look to see whether the regulation harmonizes with the plain language of
the statute, its origin, and its purpose., 40 The Court articulated factors to
determine whether an agency construction of an I.R.C. statute was valid.
These factors included the regulation's evolution, its effective longevity,
reliance, consistency of Treasury interpretation, and congressional
examination of the regulation in legislative changes.4 1
In Chevron, a case unrelated to the I.R.C., the Supreme Court
determined that agency regulations were generally evaluated under a
two-part test. 42 First, a court must ask "whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. 43 If the statute "unambiguously
expressed [the] intent of Congress," then the agency may not regulate on
the specific issue. 44 Second, if the court finds that the statue is "silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute., 45 If the agency regulation is reasonable, the court is required
to defer to the regulation.4 6
Until 2011, it was unclear whether TRs warranted the multi-factor
National Muffler analysis, or the two-step Chevron analysis.47 Courts
inconsistently cited both cases when reviewing TRs. 48 However, in
Mayo Foundation, the Supreme Court explicitly held that the TRs were
entitled to Chevron deference.49
Mayo Foundationconcerned the validity of a TR excluding medical
residents working 50 to 80 hours per week from a specific student tax
exemption.50 Using the factors set out in National Muffler, the District
39. Nat'l Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
40. Id. at 477.
41. Id.; see Hickman, supra note 6, at 1559.
42. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 837
(1984).
43. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 843.
46. See id at 844 ("A court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.").
47. See Hickman, supra note 6, at 1538 (arguing that neither academics nor the
courts had determined the proper standard for TR deference by the time of the article's
publication and arguing that they should be evaluated under the National Muffler
standard).
48. See Mayo Found, for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704,
712 (2011).
49. Seeid.at710.
50. See id. at 708-10; Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10) (2005).
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Court concluded that the TR was "inconsistent with the unambiguous
text of § 3121

...

"

and granted summary judgment for the taxpayer.51

The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the Treasury's interpretation
of the statute was entitled to Chevron deference.5 2 The Court explicitly
adopted the two-step Chevron analysis as the standard to evaluate TR
deference. 3
Although Mayo Foundation announced that Chevron deference
applies to TRs, Section 6501 cases demonstrated that Chevron deference
itself is an unsettled framework.54 Specifically, circuit courts disagreed
as to the proper level of deference due to a prior determination of
statutory ambiguity in their Chevron analysis, an issue that Brand X
attempted to resolve. 55 The application of Brand X by courts in the
on the binding effect of the Supreme Court's 1958
circuit split centers
6
Colony.1
in
case
B.

The Supreme Court's Determinationof Section 6501 Ambiguity:
Colony v. Commissioner

The controversy over Section 6501 began when the circuit courts
divided over the 1939 version of the I.R.C. 57 The 1939 I.R.C. extended
the SOL that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue ("Commissioner")
had to assess income tax deficiencies from three to five years when the
taxpayer "[omitted] from gross income an amount properly includible

51. See Mayo Found., 131 S.Ct. at710.
52. Seeid. at 713.
53. See id. The Court rejected the argument that administrative tax law is
exceptional, thus rejecting a less deferential standard of review for TRs. See id.; see also
Hickman, supra note 6, at 1600 (arguing against a special rule for TRs outside of the
Chevron framework). The Court also rejected the argument that TRs authorized by
general authority delegation under I.R.C. § 7805(a) to "prescribe all needful rules and
regulations for the enforcement" of the I.R.C., like those at issue in National Muffler,
warranted less deference than when issued under the Treasury's specific authority. I.R.C.
§ 7805(a); see Mayo Found., 131 S. Ct. at 713-14.
54. See Lipton & Young, supra note 13, at 206 (recognizing that, after Mayo
Foundation, courts are to evaluate deference according to the Chevron, rather than the
National Muffler, standard). Compare Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States,
634 F.3d 249, 257 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying Colony as a Chevron step-one holding),
aff'd, 132 S.Ct 1836 (2011), with Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d
1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (applying Colony as a Chevron step-two holding).
55. See infra Part III.A; see also Lipton & Young, supra note 13, at 206 (2011)
("[T]he first two courts of appeals to analyze Regulations under the Mayo Foundation
standard [Home Concrete and Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2011)]
declined to apply the Regulations in question.").
56. See Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 251.
57. See I.R.C. § 275(c) (1939); Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 29 (1958)
(examining the divide between the circuit courts).
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therein...."58 In Colony, the Commissioner issued deficiencies to
Colony, Inc., a real estate developer in Lexington, Kentucky, for the
1946 and 1947 tax years, shortly before the five-year SOL expired.59
The Commissioner argued that the taxpayer understated the profits of
residential land lots by including unallowable development expenses in
the calculation of the lots' basis.6 °
The Supreme Court resolved the case by concluding that an
overstatement of basis did not extend the statutory SOL from three to
five years. 61 The Court found that the statute reasonably lent itself to the
taxpayer's interpretation-that overstating basis was a result of
mistakenly including unallowable expenses in the calculation of basisand that the mistake was not an "omission" from the tax return. 6 ' The
Court began its analysis by noting, "[I]t cannot be said that the language
this admission, examining the legislative
is unambiguous. ,,63 After ti
history of the statute, and resolving the case for the taxpayer, the Court
"observe[d] that the conclusion we reach is in harmony with the
unambiguous language of section 6501(e)(1)(A) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. " 64

The 1954 version of the I.R.C. that the Court referred to as being
"in harmony" with its decision in Colony included I.R.C.
§ 6501(e)(1)(A)(i), which is referred to as the gross receipts provision.
The gross receipts provision defines "gross income" when the taxpayer is
not a "trade or business" engaged in the "sale of goods or services., 65 In
subsequent litigation, the Treasury has emphasized Colony's reference to
the gross receipts provision to argue that the Court's holding was limited

58. I.R.C. § 275(a) (1939) (emphasis added). The 1939 code extended the SOL
from three to five years. Id. The current statute extends the SOL from three to six years.
I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) (2006).
59. See Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 26 T.C. 30, 31 (1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 75 (6th Cir.
1957), rev'd, 357 U.S. 28 (1958).
60. See Colony, 357 U.S. at 31; I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2006).
61. See Colony, 357 U.S. at 38.
62. See id.
at 37.
63. Id.at 32-33.
64. Id.at 31-37 (emphasis added). The Court focused on the legislative committee's
use of the words "leave out" and "omit." Id. at 33-36. The Court noted that the
conclusion it reached under the prior version of Section 6501, I.R.C. § 275 (1939), was in
harmony with its successor provision, Section 6501. Id. at 37. This statement, in
combination with the Court's previous statement that the statute was not "unambiguous,"
and the Court's examination of legislative history, has become integral to later courts'
examination of the binding nature of the case. See, e.g., Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v.
United States, 636 F.3d 1368, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting the Colony Court's
inconsistent language).
65. See I.R.C. § 6501(e) (2006); Colony, 357 U.S. at 37 n.3.
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to trades or businesses engaged in the sale of goods or services.
Although the Treasury eventually promulgated Section 6501 TRs in
2010 limiting Section 6501, the circuit courts before the TRs focused
entirely on the language of the statute and reasoning in Colony.67
C.

The Circuit Court's Treatment of Section 6501 and Colony Before
Section 6501 Treasury Regulations

Section 6501 became increasingly important in the last decade as
the government attempted to recover revenue hidden by taxpayers in
Bond Option Sales Strategy ("Son-of-BOSS") tax shelters. 68 The Sonof-BOSS tax shelter was used to hide billions of dollars from the
Treasury. 69 A taxpayer uses a series of transactions with contingent
liabilities to artificially inflate basis, and thus reduce the taxable gains
realized when sold. 70 The Treasury eventually closed the loophole that
allowed these transactions and offered participants an opportunity to pay
66. See, e.g., Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Comm'r (Salman Ranch IV), 647 F.3d 929, 937
(10th Cir. 2011) ("The first step of Chevron requires us to ask whether Congress's intent
is clear with respect to whether the phrase 'omits from gross income an amount' in
§ 6501(e)(1)(A) includes overstatements of basis arising outside of the trade-or-business
context."). The Treasury's argument emanates from the language of the statute at issue in
Colony:

(A) General rule.-If the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount properly
includible therein which is in excess of 25 percent of the amount of gross
income stated in the return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court
for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time
within 6 years after the return was filed. For purposes of this subparagraph(i) In the case of a trade or business, the term "gross income" means the
total of the amounts received or accrued from the sale of goods or services
(if such amounts are required to be shown on the return) prior to
diminution by the cost of such sales or services; and
(ii) In determining the amount omitted from gross income, there shall not
be taken into account any amount which is omitted from gross income
stated in the return if such amount is disclosed in the return, or in a
statement attached to the return, in a manner adequate to apprise the
Secretary of the nature and amount of such item.
I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1) (2006). I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) is the gross receipts provision, from
which the trade or business exception emanates, whereas I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii) is the
gross receipt provision from which the adequate disclosure exception emanates. See
Roche, supra note 3, at 278-89.
67. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6501(e)-1, 301.6229(c)(2)-1 (as amended by T.D. 9511,
75 Fed. Reg. 78897-01 (Dec. 17, 2010)); see Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. United States
(Salman Ranch 11), 573 F.3d 1362, 1372-77 (Fed. Cir. 2009). On the other hand, since
2011, the circuit courts have focused on the validity of the TRs. See, e.g., Grapevine
Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (upholding the TRs). But
see Beard v. Comm'r, 633 F.3d 616, 623 (7th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the six-year
SOL applied before reaching the question of TR validity).
68.
69.
70.

See generally Wagner, supranote 2, at 46-48.
See id.
See id.

2012]

ABOLISHING THE SHELTER OF AMBIGUITY

their deficiencies with interest and a small penalty. 7' As the IRS
attempted to litigate against the taxpayers who did not participate in the
settlement, they ran into Section 6501 SOL problems. 72 The three-year
SOL inhibited the Treasury's efforts to recoup billions of dollars hidden
by these gain-sheltering transactions.7 3 Before the promulgation of the
Section 6501 TRs, the ability of the Treasury to invoke the six-year SOL
hinged entirely on the judicial interpretation of Section 6501 and
Colony.74

Some courts applied Colony without exception, declining to extend
the SOL whenever the deficiency resulted from an overstatement of
basis.75 Others granted the Treasury relief by limiting Colony to the
trade or business exception. 76 The Salman Ranch cases demonstrated
these approaches, how taxpayers took advantage of Section 6501, and the
frustration that the IRS faced when litigating deficiencies under the

71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 51 (concluding that, as of 2011, 35 to 50 Son-of-BOSS transactions
and over a billion dollars remained in pending litigation).
74. See, e.g., Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States (Salman Ranch I), 79 Fed. Cl. 189,
194-96 (2007) (focusing on Colony'to determine that Section 6501 did extend the SOL to
six years).
75. See Bakersfield Energy Partners v. Comm'r, 568 F.3d 767, 778 (9th Cir. 2009);
Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. United States (Salman Ranch II), 573 F.3d 1362, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
76. See Beard v. Comm'r, 633 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 2011); Brandon Ridge
Partners v. United States, 2007 WL 2209129, at *6-7 (M.D. Fla. July 30, 2009). In
applying the gross receipts provision of I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i) (2006), a court limits
Colony to "omissions of income derived only from the sale of goods or services by trades
or businesses." See Roche, supra note 3, at 296. Some courts also limited Colony using
the adequate disclosure test, derived from the adequate disclosure provision of I.R.C.
§ 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii) (2006) (which has not been an issue in the 2011 circuit split), in
which a court asks whether or not the taxpayer placed the Commissioner at a "special
disadvantage" in determining if something was omitted from the return. See id. at 27879. Congress also provided some relief to the Treasury by amending I.R.C. § 6501(c)
(2000) in 2004 to expand the SOL for fraudulent "listed transactions." See id. at 291.
However, many cases remain subject to Section 6501 and Colony. The American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-357, 118 Stat 1418, "tightened the rules relating to tax
shelters by replacing the existing tax shelter registration regime with a disclosure regime
that is supported by stiff penalties for tax shelter participants." Id. (footnote omitted).
The American Jobs Creation Act amended I.R.C. § 6501(c) by adding a provision that
extended the SOL to one year after disclosure to the Treasury when the taxpayer "fails to
disclose a listed transaction." Id. However, the narrow focus of I.R.C. § 6501(c)'s antifraud SOL has left most cases subject to the I.R.C. § 6501(e) determination that Congress
failed to amend. Id.
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statute.7 7 Salman Ranch has been litigated four times in two different
circuits.78
In 1987, owners of Salman Ranch in Mora County, New Mexico,
formed Salman Ranch, Ltd., a limited partnership with four principle
shareholders.79 In 1998, three of the four principle shareholders created
new, separate limited partnerships. 80 The following year, each of the
Salman Ranch partners conducted short-sale 81 transactions of U.S.
Treasury Notes and sold them to a third party for a combined
$10,982,373.82 Several days later, each of the individual partnerships
transferred the proceeds from the short-sale, and the corresponding short
positions, to the Salman Ranch partnership.8 3 Following the transfer,
Salman Ranch closed the short position by purchasing the Treasury
Notes for $10,980,866.84
Each of the three Salman Ranch partners contributed their portion
of their ownership in the Salman Ranch partnership to newly formed
individual limited partnerships. 85 This transaction technically terminated
the Salman Ranch partnership, allowing the individual partnerships to
elect to increase their basis in the Salman Ranch partnership by including
the amount of the proceeds earned in the short-sale.86 Thus, each
partner's new basis in Salman Ranch's final tax return after its technical
termination included proceeds from the short-sale without taking into
account the corresponding obligation to close the short-sale.87
Thereafter, the partnership sold part of the ranch, and an option to

77. See generally Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Comm'r (Salman Ranch IV), 647 F.3d 929,
931-37 (10th Cir. 2011) (discussing the transactions at issue and the procedural posture of
the four cases involving the Salman Ranch partnership).
78. See id.
79. Salman Ranch I, 79 Fed. Cl. at 191 (2007).
80. Id.
81. See generally Bernard J. Audet, Jr., One Case to Rule Them All: The Ninth
Circuit in Bakersfield Applies Colony to Deny the IRS an Extended Statute of Limitations
in Overstatement of Basis Cases, 55 VILL. L. REv. 409, 410 n.6 (2010) (explaining a
short-sale transaction). In a short-sale transaction, a taxpayer borrows a security from a
broker and sells them for cash to a third party. See id. This sale creates an obligation,
termed a "short position," to replace (or "close") the broker's security. See id. The
taxpayer profits from the transaction if the market price of the security falls before he
must replace it with the broker. See id.
82. Salman Ranch 1, 79 Fed. Cl. at 191.
83. Id. at 190.
84. Id. The slight difference between the amount that the bonds were sold for and
closed for reflected a change in the market price for the bonds. See id.
85. Id. at 191.
86. Id. The partnership was automatically terminated pursuant to I.R.C.
§ 708(b)(1)(B) (2006), thus allowing the partners to adjust their basis pursuant to I.R.C.
§§ 754 and 734(b)(1) (2006). See Salman Ranch 1, 79 Fed. Cl. at 191.
87. Id.
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purchase the remainder, for $7,088,588.88 Salman Ranch filed its tax
return for 1999 on April 16, 2000, reporting proceeds from the sale of
$7,188,588.00, and a cost basis of $6,850,276-a taxable gain of
$338,312.89
The IRS issued an administrative deficiency notification-a Final
Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA), on April 10, 2006-just
before the six-year SOL on Salman Ranch's 1999 return expired. 90 The
FPAA notified the taxpayer that it had overstated its basis in its 1999 tax
return, resulting in a $4,567,949 deficiency in reported capital gain
income of the partnership. 9 1 The IRS based its conclusion on the failure
of the partnership to offset its basis92in the short-sale by the corresponding
obligation to close the transaction.
In Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. United States (Salman Ranch J),93 the
partnership brought an action in the United States Court of Federal
Claims, arguing that the FPAA was untimely because it was issued after
the expiration of the three-year SOL under Section 6501. 94 The case
turned on whether "omits from gross income" under the Section applied
to an overstatement of basis.95 The Court held for the Commissioner,
applying the six-year SOL. 96 The Court applied the trade or business
exception by construing gross income as receipts from a trade or
business engaged in the sale of goods or services.9 7 Thus, the Court
reasoned that Salman Ranch was not bound by Colony because the
partnership was not, like the taxpayer
in Colony, a trade or business
98
within the meaning of the statute.
88. Id.
89. Id. By increasing their basis in the partnership, the partners were able to reduce
the difference between the amount realized from the short-sale and the adjusted basis,
thereby reducing the partners' tax liability. See I.R.C. § 1001 (2006) ("The gain from the
sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess of the amount realized therefrom
over the adjusted basis ...").
90. Salman Ranch 1, 79 Fed. CI. at 191.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States (Salman Ranch I), 79 Fed. Cl. 189 (2007).
94. Id. at 190. The partners paid the deficiency and filed a claim to obtain a refund
for the amount paid. See id.
95. See id.at 193.
96. See id.at 204.
97. See id. at 200-203; I.R.C. § 650 1(e)(1)(A)(i-ii) (2006). It was in relation to this
trade or business provision that the Supreme Court in Colony "observe[d] that the
conclusion [they reached was] in harmony with the unambiguous language of s [sic]
6501(e)(1)(A) of the internal revenue code of 1954." Colony v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 37
(1958).
98. See Salman Ranch I, 79 Fed. Cl. at 200-03. The court also dismissed Salman
Ranch's argument that they were entitled to the three-year SOL because they adequately
disclosed the nature of the transaction pursuant to I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii) (2006). See
id. at 204.
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On appeal, in Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. United States (Salman Ranch
11),99 the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the three-year SOL
applied, and the recovery of any deficiency in the 1999 tax return was
time-barred. 100 The Court refused to limit Colony to taxpayers who were
trades or businesses. 10
In Salman Ranch v. Commissioner (Salman Ranch 11),102 the
controversy was litigated in the Tax Court. Salman Ranch III concerned
Salman Ranch's 2001 and 2002 returns. 10 3 The case was appealed and
heard by the Tenth Circuit in Salman Ranch v. Commissioner (Salman
Ranch IV). '4 The tax returns at issue reported the buyer's exercise of
the option to purchase the remainder of Salman Ranch's land from the
1999 transaction.O5 Again, the IRS issued a FPAA almost six years after
Salman Ranch filed the return. 10 6 The IRS determined that, after the
partners' basis was properly reduced, the partnership's taxable income
would increase by $1,331,281 in 2001 and $3,524,010 in 2002.107 The
Tax Court sided with the taxpayer, holding that the three-year SOL
08
applied.
After the Tax Court's decision in Salman Ranch III, but before the
appeal concluded in the Tenth Circuit's decision in Salman Ranch IV, the
IRS exercised its general statutory authority and promulgated Section
6501 TRs to bolster their position in the ongoing litigation.' 0 9 The
Treasury issued temporary TRs on September 28, 2009,110 and final TRs

99. Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States (Salman Ranch II), 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
100. See id. at 1363.
101. See id at 1373-75. The court also refused to apply the adequate disclosure test
of I.R.C. § 650 1(e)(1)(A)(ii) (2006). See id.
102. Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Comm'r (Salman Ranch III), No. 13677-08 (T.C. Aug. 7,
2009).
103. Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Comm'r (Salman Ranch IV), 647 F.3d 929, 932 (10th Cir.
2011).
104. Id. at 929.
105. Id. at 932.
106. Id. at 933.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 935 (noting that the Tax Court explicitly followed its prior decision in
Bakersfield Energy Partners v. Comm'r, 128 T.C. 207 (2007), affd, 568 F.3d 767 (9th
Cir. 2009)).
109. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6501(e)-i, 301.6229(c)(2)-1 (as amended T.D. 9511, 75
Fed. Reg. 78897-01) (Dec. 17, 2010)). Some parties have argued that issuing regulations
during ongoing litigation should be invalid. See, e.g., Salman Ranch IV, 647 F.3d at 940.
However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument in Mayo Foundation. See Mayo
Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 712-13 (2011).
110. Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6229(c)(2)-lT(b), 301.6501(e)-lT(b) (as amended by
T.D. 9466) (effective Sept. 24, 2009 to Dec. 13, 2010).
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on December 14, 2010.11 The Section 6501 TRs exploited the addition
of the gross receipts provision and ruled that "an understated amount of
gross income resulting from an overstatement of unrecovered cost or
other basis constitutes an omission from gross income [when applied to
trades or businesses]."112

In 2012, in Home Concrete, the Supreme Court evaluated the final
Section 6501 TRs, applying Chevron deference.11 3 The Court concluded
that its ruling in Colony was unambiguous and that the final Section 6501
TRs were therefore invalid. 114 However, the Court was left to address
another unresolved issue that it first attempted to answer in Brand X:
115
when is a court bound by prior determination of statutory ambiguity.
Although the Home Concrete decision ended the debate over Colony's
statutory interpretation of "omits from gross income," the Court's Brand
X analysis was limited to a nonbinding plurality opinion.'16
III. ANALYSIS
As detailed in Part II, the circuit split over extending the SOL under
Section 6501 involved (1) the standard of deference applied to TRs,
(2) whether Colony controlled the outcome of the Section's ambiguity,
and (3) the validity of the Section 6501 TRs. 117 Accordingly, this
Section will argue that the circuit split and the recent Supreme Court
111. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6501(e)-I, 301.6229(c)(2)-1 (as amended T.D. 9511, 75 Fed.
Reg. 78897-01 (Dec. 17, 2010)). Both the temporary TRs and the final TRs were largely
a result of IRS litigation in Bakersield Energy Partnersv. Commissioner, 568 F.3d 767
(9th Cir. 2009). See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6501(e)-1, 301.6229(c)(2)-1 (as amended T.D.
9511, 75 Fed. Reg. 78897-01 (Dec. 17, 2010)). In Bakersfield Energy, the Court refused
to extend the SOL to six years, applying the Colony interpretation and limiting the
extension to trades or businesses. However, the court noted that the Treasury "may have
the authority to promulgate a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous provision of the
tax code, even if its interpretation runs contrary to the Supreme Court's opinion as to the
best reading of the provision." Bakersfield Energy, 568 F.3d at 778.
112. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.6501(e)-1, 301.6229(c)(2)-l (as amended T.D. 9511, 75 Fed.
Reg. 78897-01 (Dec. 17, 2010)) (emphasis added). The final regulations were issued on
December 17, 2010, and explicitly disagreed with the tax court's decision in
IntermountainInsuranceService of Vail v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 211 (2010), in which
the tax court declared the temporary regulations invalid. See id.
113. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1847
(2011); Mayo Foundation, 131 S. Ct. at 713 ("[T]he principles underlying our decision in
Chevron apply with full force in the tax context.").
114. See Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1844.
115. See Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368, 1377-78 (2011)
(discussing the impact of BrandXon the court's Colony analysis).
116. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1842-43
(2011).
117. See Carpenter Family Invs., LLC v. Comm'r, 136 T.C. 373, 381 (2011)
(implicitly arguing that, for a court to uphold the TRs, the court must create an ambiguity
for the Treasury to regulate by applying the "trade or business" exception).
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plurality decision demonstrate the failure of the Brand X framework and
will present a methodology that can be used to avoid the Brand X
problem in the future.
Section A of this Part will argue that Brand X is an important, yet
ambiguous precedent. Part B will argue that Brand X's ambiguity was
implicated in all five Section 6501 cases decided by the circuit courts
since the promulgation of the Section 6501 TRs. Part C will argue that
none of the frameworks suggested in the literature' 18 or used by the
courts will produce consistent application of BrandX.19 In fact, Part C
will show that Brand X cannot be clarified using any framework that
attempts to determine when a prior determination of statutory ambiguity
has been made. 120
Instead, as Part D will argue, courts should distinguish prior
determinations of statutory ambiguity where possible, avoiding Brand X
altogether. Finally, Part E will argue that avoiding the BrandX question
and deferring to agencies whenever possible is the only way to ensure
consistency in lower courts and faithfulness to Chevron's deferential
standard. 12!
A.

Brand X: An Important Precedentwith Ambiguous Meaning

Brand X attempted to resolve the tension between two
countervailing judicial principles: Chevron's deference to administrative
agencies to interpret statutes on the one hand, and the judiciary's power
"to say what the law is" on the other.122 In BrandX,the Supreme Court
held that a "court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an
agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the
prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency

118. See Implementing BrandX: What Counts as a Step One Holding?, 119 HARv. L.
REV. 1532, 1539-40 (2006).
119. Compare Home Concrete & Supply v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 257
(applying BrandXto conclude that Colony foreclosed agency regulation), affd, 132 S. Ct
1836 (2011), with Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Comm'r (Salman Ranch IV), 647 F.3d 929, 939
(applying BrandX to conclude that Colony did not foreclose agency regulation).
120. See CarpenterFamily Invs., 136 T.C. at 390 n.21 (discussing the chaotic nature
of decisions since BrandX).
121. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J.
833, 918-19; Craig, supra note 31, at 18.
122. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803); see Nat'l Cable & Telecomms.
Ass'n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1017 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Article III courts do not sit to render decisions that can be reversed or ignored by
executive officers."); see also Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous:
Substantive Canons, Stare Decisis, and the CentralRole of Ambiguity Determinationsin
the Administrative State, 69 MD.L. REV. 791, 797 (2010).
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discretion." 123 Therefore, a court applying the BrandX test asks whether
the decision in the prior case determining statutory ambiguity followed
from the unambiguous terms of the statute. 124 The test is important
because it is possible that an agency regulation can trump binding
judicial precedents, even when they contradict.1 25 That is, a court
interpreting Brand X can characterize a prior determination of statutory
ambiguity as either: (1) a Chevron step-one holding, in which a statute is
unambiguous, therefore foreclosing alternative interpretations; or (2) a
Chevron step-two holding, in which the statute is ambiguous and the
prior determination of 26statutory ambiguity represented but one
reasonable interpretation. 1
Commentators attempting to clarify the Brand X test disagree as to
127
how cases decided before Brand X fit into the Chevron framework.
Similarly, courts have been unable to find a consistent framework to
determine when a previously adjudicated prior case has made a binding
determination of statutory ambiguity. 128 As a result, courts arbitrarily
label a prior statutory interpretation of ambiguity either as: (1) binding,
thus foreclosing agency regulation because the prior case took the only
reasonable interpretation; or, (2) as not binding, thus allowing regulation
because the prior case took only a reasonable interpretation.129 This
inconsistent application of the Brand X test is arguably a result of courts
being unable to determine when a prior decision "follows from the
unambiguous terms of the statute.,'' 3 °
Brand X is powerful because it can re-characterize what might
otherwise be binding precedent.' 31 Brand X attempts to create a
framework to save appellate courts from re-characterizing where the
123. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982
(2005) (emphasis added).
124. See id.
125. See Richard Murphy, The Brand X Constitution, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1247,
1251 (2007).
126. Compare Home Concrete & Supply v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 258
(Wilkinson, J., concurring) ("I believe that Colony was decided under Chevron step
one."), affd, 132 S.Ct 1836 (2011), with Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Comm'r (Salman Ranch
IV), 647 F.3d 929, 937-39 (10th Cir. 2011) (concluding that Colony is not conclusive
regarding Chevron step-one, but rather a reasonable interpretation applied to the trade
and business context).
127. See Implementing BrandX, supra note 118, at 1533 (2006).
128. See Administrative Law, supra note 32, at 1067.
129. See Implementing BrandX, supra note 118, at 1539-40 (2006).
130. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982
(2005); see also Implementing Brand X, supra note 118, at 1539-40 (discussing three
tests for determining the applicability of a prior judicial determination of ambiguity);
Craig, supra note 31, at 18-24 (comparing courts that deferred to agency regulation over
jurisdictional precedents to those courts that did not).
131. See Murphy, supra note 125, at 1316.
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court's prior decisions fit into Chevron analysis on a case-by-case
basis. 132 However, Brand X also leaves parties without direction by
33
weakening reliance on stare decisis.1
Indeed, since the promulgation of
the final Section 6501 TRs, the circuit courts have interpreted the
meaning of Colony inconsistently, exemplifying the unworkability of
34
BrandX. 1

B.

The Ambiguity of Brand X is Apparent in the Colony CircuitSplit

The circuit split over Section 6501 and whether courts are bound by
Colony demonstrates that judges are unable to apply Brand X
consistently. 3 5 The divergent outcomes emanate from the courts'
application of Colony as either a Chevron step-one or step-two
holding.' 3 6 Two courts implicitly applied Colony as a Chevron step-one
holding.' 37 In Home Concrete, the Fourth Circuit began its Chevron
analysis by asking whether the Section 6501 TRs interpreted an
ambiguous statute. 38 The court decided that Colony declared Section
6501 to be unambiguous, thus constituted binding precedent that the TRs
could not displace. 3 9 Similarly, in Burks v. United States,'40 the court
decided that Colony stood for the proposition that Section 6501 was
unambiguous, rendering the TRs invalid.14 Neither court found that the

132. See Administrative Law, supra note 32, at 1071-72 (explaining that Brand X
would be problematic if applied inconsistently); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 121, at
919.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 255
(4th Cir. 2011) (discussing the ability of the Treasury to regulate in the wake of Colony),
aff'd, 132 S. Ct 1836 (2011); AdministrativeLaw, supra note 32, at 1072 (characterizing
the majority and the dissent in Intermountain Insurance Service of Vail v. Commissioner,
650 F.3d 691, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2011), as "bickering" over the proper application of Brand

x).
135. Compare Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 254 (implicitly applying the "magic
words" test, a Chevron step-one test to conclude that Colony was binding), with
Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(implicitly applying the "totality of the opinion" test to conclude that Colony was not
binding).
136. Compare Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 257 (applying Colony as a Chevron stepone holding, that the statute was unambiguous and for closing alternative interpretations),
with Grapevine Imports, 636 F.3d at 1380 (applying Colony as a Chevron step-two
holding, that the Colony provided a reasonable interpretation of the statute that would
permit other regulatory interpretations).
137. See Home Concrete,634 F.3d at 257; Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347, 360
(5th Cir. 2011).
138. See Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 257.
139. See id (applying BrandX implicitly by citation).
140. Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2011).
141. See id. at 360 (applying Colony without citing BrandX).

2012]

ABOLISHING THE SHELTER OF AMBIGUITY

addition of the gross receipts provision in the 195442 I.R.C. limited the
binding precedent of Colony to trades or businesses. 1
Conversely, three circuits held that the TRs were valid by implicitly
applying Colony as a Chevron step-two holding. 143 These courts found
that Colony represented one reasonable interpretation of the statute,
rather than the only reasonable interpretation of the statute. 144 In
Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States,14 Salman Ranch IV, and
Intermountain Insurance Service of Vail v. Commissioner,146 the courts
conducted a step-one Chevron analysis by examining the statutory
language and legislative history.147 The courts applied the BrandX test
to determine whether Colony made a binding determination of statutory
ambiguity.
The courts emphasized the Colony Court's use of
"ambiguous" and argued that Colony never purported to hold that its
interpretation was the only interpretation that could follow from the
statute. 148
Notably, the three courts characterized Colony's holding as limited
by the gross receipts provision added in the 1954 I.R.C. 149 They argued
that this provision's addition signaled Congress's intent to apply
Colony's exclusion of basis overstatement in "omits from gross income,"
reasoning that it applies only to trades or businesses.' 50 Accordingly, in
these three cases, the courts found that the gross receipts provision was
inapplicable because they involved Son-of-BOSS transactions in
142. See Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 254-55; Burks, 633 F.3d at 355-59.
143. See Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2011); Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Comm'r (Salman Ranch IV), 647 F.3d 929, 940 (10th Cir.
2011); Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail v. Comm'r, 650 F.3d 691, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
144. See, e.g., Grapevine Imports, 636 F.3d at 1380 ("Colony's holding does not
foreclose reasonable disagreement in agency rules under Chevron. Neither that case nor
Salman Ranch found Congress's intent was so clear as to support no reasonable
interpretation other than the taxpayer's.").
145. Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
146. Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail v. Comm'r, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
147. See Grapevine Imports, 636 F.3d at 1376-80 ("[Colony,] while instructive,
do[es] not resolve the question for purposes of Chevron step one."); Salman Ranch IV,
647 F.3d at 937-39; IntermountainIns., 650 F.3d at 701-07.
148. See Grapevine Imports, 636 F.3d at 1378-79; Salman Ranch IV, 647 F.3d at 93739; Intermountain Ins., 650 F.3d at 705-06. While Chevron step-one analysis asks
whether a statute is ambiguous, congressional intent and legislative history are also
considered in addition to statutory construction. See Anderson v. Dep't of Labor, 422
F.3d 1155, 1180 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)).
149. See I.R.C. § 6501(e)(l)(A)(i) (2006); Grapevine Imports, 636 F.3d at 1378;
Salman Ranch IV, 647 F.3d at 938; IntermountainIns., 650 F.3d at 705-06.
150. See, e.g., Intermountain Ins., 650 F.3d at 702-03 (concluding that Congress
added I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i), the gross receipts provision, in the 1954 code so that
overstatements of basis would not be included in "omits from gross income" in the trade
or business context and, thus, Colony was not binding outside the trade or business
context).
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partnerships that were not trades or businesses within the meaning of the
statute. 151
The three circuit courts then conducted a Chevron step-two inquiry,
asking whether the agency's interpretation was reasonable. 152 The courts
determined that, outside the trade or business context, it is reasonable to
assume that Congress would have included an overstatement of basis as
"omits from gross income" because gross income is determined by
subtracting the basis from the amount realized on an item sold, 15 3 The
courts explicitly declined 54to adopt Colony's interpretation outside the
trade or business context. 1
The inability of the courts to determine whether Colony had made a
binding determination of Section 6501's ambiguity caused the circuit
split. 55 The courts focused on where the prior decision fit into the
Chevron analysis. 156 Brand X's attempt to determine when a court was
57
bound by a pre-existing determination of statutory ambiguity failed.1
However, the circuit courts might have produced consistent
interpretations of Colony if a workable framework existed that could
consistently apply the BrandX test.
C.

No Formulation of the Brand X Test Will Yield Consistent Results

Under BrandX, a prior determination of statutory ambiguity should
only bind a court if the earlier court found that the statute was
unambiguous: a Chevron step-one holding. 158 As discussed, courts have
151. See Grapevine Imports, 636 F.3d at 1372; Salman Ranch IV, 647 F.3d at 932-33;
IntermountainIns., 650 F.3d at 695.
152. See Grapevine Imports, 636 F.3d at 1380; Salman Ranch IV, 647 F.3d at 939;
IntermountainIns., 650 F.3d at 707.
153. See I.R.C. § 1001 (2006); Grapevine Imports, 636 F.3d at 1380; Salman Ranch
IV, 647 F.3d *at 940; Intermountain Ins., 650 F.3d at 707. The courts also examined
legislative intent and reasoned that the addition of the gross receipts provision in 1954
rendered Section 6501 meaningless without limiting Colony to the trade or business
context. See, e.g., Grapevine Imports, 636 F.3d at 1380 (discussing legislative intent).
154. See Grapevine Imports, 636 F.3d at 1380; Salman Ranch IV, 647 F.3d at 940;
IntermountainIns., 650 F.3d at 707.
155. See Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347, 360 (5th Cir. 2011); Home Concrete &
Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 257 (4th Cir. 2011), aff'd, 132 S.Ct 1836
(2011); Grapevine Imports, 636 F.3d at 1380; Salman Ranch IV, 647 F.3d at 940;
IntermountainIns., 650 F.3d at 707.
156. See Burks, 633 F.3d at 360; Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 257; Grapevine
Imports, 636 F.3d at 1380; Salman Ranch IV, 647 F.3d at 940; Intermountain Ins., 650
F.3d at 707.
157. See Burks, 633 F.3d at 360; Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 257; Grapevine
Imports, 636 F.3d at 1380; Salman Ranch IV, 647 F.3d at 940; Intermountain Ins., 650
F.3d at 707.
158. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
982 (2005) ("A court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency
construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision
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taken divergent approaches when deciding what constitutes a prior
Chevron step-one holding, and courts have applied none of them
consistently. 159
Commentators have suggested several frameworks in which courts
could apply Brand X with consistency. 160 However, applying these
frameworks to Section 6501 reveals that it is impossible to create
consistency by deciding when a prior construction
of statutory ambiguity
61
constitutes a Chevron step-one holding. 1
First, courts could look for "magic words" in an opinion, finding a
binding determination of a statute's ambiguity-a Chevron step-one
holding-any time the case refers to statutory language as "clear" or
"unambiguous."1 62 The Section 6501 cases demonstrate the futility of
the magic words approach.163 For example, in Home Concrete, the
Fourth Circuit interpreted Colony's use of the word "unambiguous" as
referring to all applications of Section 6501.1 64 Similarly, the Court1 in65
Salman Ranch IV referred to Colony's use of "unambiguous.
However, that Court came to an entirely different conclusion: Colony
holds that the only ambiguous part of Section 6501 was the provision
referring to an overstatement of basis in the trade or business context. 166
The Salman Ranch IV Court, therefore, focused on Colony's use of
"ambiguous" as it referred to the statute outside the trade or business
67

context. 1

Second, courts could use a "totality of the opinion" approach,
asking whether the pre-Chevron court would have held that the statute

holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus
leaves no room for agency discretion.").
159. See Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 260
(Wilkinson, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging the disruption that the circuit split has caused
in the Chevron, BrandX, and Mayo Foundation continuum).

160.

Contra Administrative Law, supra note 32, at 1073 (arguing that the "if

necessary" test would result in equal application of BrandX).
161. See Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347, 353-54 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing the
divergent opinions in Section 6501 cases).
162. See Implementing BrandX,supra note 118, at 1539-40.
163. See, e.g., Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 259 (Wilkinson, J., concurring)
(concluding that Colony's use of "unambiguous" could not be ignored, even though the
court also defined the statute as "ambiguous").
164. See id. at 257 (majority opinion).
165. See Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Comm'r (Salman Ranch IV), 647 F.3d 929, 938 (10th
Cir. 2011).
166. See id.
167. See id; see also United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct.
1836, 1847 (Scalia, J., concurring) (2011) ("In cases decided pre-BrandX,the Court had
no inkling that it must utter the magic words 'ambiguous' or 'unambiguous' in order to
(poofl) expand or abridge executive power, and (poofl) enable or disable administrative
contradiction of the Supreme Court.").
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was ambiguous if it were applying Chevron "counterfactually."'' 68 As
with elements of the "magic words" approach, there are elements of the
"totality of the opinion" approach in Section 6501 cases that demonstrate
its futility as a possible Brand X framework. 169 The problems with this
approach are evidenced in the Tax Court's most recent case, Carpenter
Family Investments v. Commissioner,170 in which the Court implicitly
171
attempted to evaluate Colony as if it had decided post-Chevron.
Although the Tax Court eventually concluded that Colony determined
Section 6501 was unambiguous, its analysis could not be applied
consistently. 172 The court lingered on the appropriateness of Colony's
use of legislative history to divine congressional intent, the policy
considerations behind Colony's interpretation, and whether Brand X
could displace a Supreme Court precedent. 7 3 Considering such diverse
totality of the opinion approach too convoluted to
factors makes the 174
apply consistently.
Finally, courts could find a binding determination of ambiguity-a
Chevron step-one holding-when the previous court "could have only
reached the result it did by holding that its interpretation was the only
reasonable one."' 175 That is, courts should find a binding Chevron stepone holding only when the previous court's interpretation of the statute's
ambiguity was "necessary" to its holding.1 76 However, it is difficult to
imagine a situation in which a court would have to determine that a
finding of no ambiguity was necessary for its holding; rather, the more
likely conclusion will be that the court's reasonable interpretation was

168. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 121, at 917; Implementing Brand X, supra
note 118, at 1539.
169. See Administrative Law, supra note 32, at 1072.
170. Carpenter Family Invs., LLC. v. Comm'r, 136 T.C. 373 (2011).
171. Seeid. at 390-94.
172. See id. This conclusion was a step-one holding. See id.
173. See id. at 389-90, 394. In a concurring opinion to Brand X, Justice Stevens
noted that lower courts might not be able to displace a statutory interpretation by the
Supreme Court because of the precedential power of its decisions. See Nat'l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass'n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("[BrandX's reasoning] would not necessarily be applicable to a decision by
this Court that would presumably remove any pre-existing ambiguity.").
174. See AdministrativeLaw, supranote 32, at 1072.
175. See Implementing Brand X, supra note 118, at 1540-47 (emphasis added)
(concluding that the "if necessary" test is best because it has low decision costs, a high
degree of "accurate statutory interpretation," and it correctly balances stability of judicial
precedent with the agency flexibility).
176. See Administrative Law, supra note 32, at 1072 (explaining that a case-by-case
totality of the opinion approach "would likely lead to deep intercircuit disagreement").
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necessary for its holding.117 Therefore, it will be difficult to apply the "if
necessary" test with consistency.
As discussed above, the varied approaches that commentators have
advocated for BrandX consistency are untenable in light of the Section
6501 cases. 178 Courts should not inquire when pre-existing precedent
applies, or where it constitutes a Chevron step-one or Chevron step-two
conclusion. Instead, courts should avoid the question by limiting the
prior court's construction as narrowly as possible.' 79
D.

Courts Can Only Achieve Consistency by DistinguishingPrecedent
When Possible

The different results in the circuit courts emanate from different
interpretations of the Brand X test for when a prior precedent
determining statutory ambiguity should bind a subsequent court.L 8 The
circuit courts' decisions focus on determining if Colony's "construction
follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute."' 8'1 This focus
resulted in courts treating the trade and business exception differently,
demonstrating that the8 2 current Brand X jurisprudence is impossible to
consistently construe.1

Although the essence of the circuit split was the application of
Colony as a Chevron step-one or step-two holding, each court's
conclusion was grounded in its willingness to distinguish Colony based

177. Contra id at 1073 n.65. In support of the "if necessary" test, the author cited a
case "interpreting a prior court's analysis as a holding because it was not a 'stray mark or
aside."' Id. (citation omitted). However the author does not explain how the "if
necessary" test would apply in any other practical scenario. See id. at 1066-73.
178. See id. at 1066 (criticizing a BrandX test that would ask "what the court would
have held had it decided the case after Chevron was handed down").
179. See infra Part III.E.
180. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n. v. Brand X Intemet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
982 (2005) ("A court's prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency
construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision
holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus
leaves no room for agency discretion.").
181. See, e.g., Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (citing Brand X to determine where Colony fits into the Chevron analysis).
Although not all the circuit courts explicitly used BrandX, all at least implicitly applied
Brand X by asking whether Colony constituted a binding determination of statutory
ambiguity. See, e.g., Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail v. Comm'r, 650 F.3d 691, 703
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (discussing the effect of Colony on the Chevron analysis without
actually citing BrandXin the opinion).
182. Id. Compare Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249,
257, 257 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying BrandX to conclude that Colony foreclosed agency
regulation), af'd, 132 S.Ct 1836 (2011), with Salman Ranch IV, 647 F.3d at 939
(applying BrandX to conclude that Colony did not foreclose agency regulation).
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on the trade or business exception.183 The circuit courts that refused to
extend the SOL characterized Colony as applying to any overstatement
of basis, regardless of whether the entity was a trade or business. 184 By
contrast, the courts that extended the SOL to six years found that Colony
was only a reasonable interpretation of Section 6501, and that the Section
6501 TRs represented another reasonable interpretation. 185 Instead of
resting their decision on the binding power of Colony, the courts should
have considered, before moving to the Chevron and Brand X analysis,
whether the court could distinguish Colony, thus avoiding an analysis
that asks whether Colony made a determination of statutory ambiguity
altogether. Applying this framework, the courts would only need to
examine the binding power of Colony in the trade or business context,
and would be able to distinguish Colony outside the trade or business
context. 186
87
In Home Concrete, the Supreme Court failed to apply BrandX. 1
Instead, the Court implicitly engaged in a BrandX analysis by asking if
Colony made a binding determination of statutory ambiguity. The Court
attempted to avoid determining whether Colony represented a Chevron
step-one or step-two holding, and instead purported to rest its decision on
stare decisis.188 However, the Court did not successfully avoid Chevron
or Brand X. 189 In fact, aside from distinguishing precedent, it is
impossible to avoid Brand X because any implicit determination on the
binding authority of a prior court's ambiguity determination will
necessarily implicate BrandX'90
The Supreme Court held that Section 6501 was unambiguous in all
contexts. The Court decided Colony's meaning without explaining why
the case constituted a binding determination of ambiguity.' 9' The Court
183. See Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347, 360 (5th Cir. 2011); Home Concrete,
634 F.3d at 257; Grapevine Imports, 636 F.3d at 1380; Salman Ranch IV, 647 F.3d at
940; IntermountainIns., 650 F.3d at 707.
184. See Burks, 633 F.3d at 360; Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 257.
185. See Grapevine Imports, 636 F.3d at 1380; Salman Ranch IV, 647 F.3d at 940;
Intermountain Ins., 650 F.3d at 707.
186. See, e.g., Salman Ranch IV, 647 F.3d at 939 ("While we know now what "omits
from gross income" means in § 6501(e)(1)(A) when a trade or business is involved
because of subparagraph (i), it is still far from clear what Congress intended it to mean in
other contexts.").
187. Accord Richard Lipton & Russell Young, Supreme Court's Decision in Home
Concrete Reveals Cracks in the Foundationof BrandX, 117 J. TAX'N 4, 4 (2012) ("As a
result of the divided court in Home Concrete, the application of Brand X in future cases
is highly uncertain.").
188. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1841
(2011) (purporting that the decision of the case rests on staredecisis).
189. See Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1847 (Scalia, J., concurring).
190. See id. at 1848.
191. See Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1841.
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implicitly applied Brand X by holding that that the Supreme Court's
prior interpretation of Section 6501 was a binding determination of
statutory ambiguity. 92 However, the Court did not explain why Colony
constituted a Chevron step-one holding-that Section
6501 was
93
unambiguous-which may lead to continuing frustration. 1
If the Supreme Court did not want to engage in a Brand X analysis,
the Court could have avoided the Brand X question entirely by limiting
Colony to trades or businesses. 94 If the Supreme Court had limited
Colony to trades or businesses, the Court would have resolved the case
before reaching Chevron and Brand X, and avoided whether Colony
constituted a binding decision of statutory ambiguity. 95
By
distinguishing precedent, the court could have avoided the Brand X
confusion entirely.
Distinguishing prior precedent is necessary because, as the Section
6501 cases demonstrate, frameworks that have attempted to clarify when
a court's interpretation "followed from the unambiguous terms of the
statute" have failed. 196 Instead, by construing ambiguity precedents
narrowly, courts will be consistent with Chevron deference jurisprudence
and will limit the frequency in which courts confront the impossible
BrandX question. 197
E.

Avoiding Brand X Will Ensure Consistency in Lower Courts and
Faithfulness to Chevron

In Home Concrete, the Supreme Court could have held that
Colony's mandate was limited to taxpayers that are trades or businesses
before attempting to decide whether the case constituted a binding

192. See id. at 1843. The Court lays out the Treasury's argument, explaining the
Court's decision in one statement: "In our view, Colony has already interpreted the
statute, and there is no longer any different construction that is consistent with Colony
and available for adoption by the agency." Id. at 1841.
193. See Brief for Respondents, United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, 132 S. Ct.
1836 (2012) (No. 11-139), 2011 WL 6325858, at *i; Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 258
(Wilkinson, J., concurring) (acknowledging that "it is sometimes difficult to determine
whether pre-Chevron decisions are based upon 'Chevron step one'); Lipton & Young,
supra note 187, at 4.
194. See Lipton & Young, supra note 187, at 10 ("While the court cited Brand X...
nothing in the majority opinion indicates why Colony does not present a situation where a
judicial interpretation must give way to a conflicting agency interpretation.").
195. See Lipton & Young, supra note 187, at 9 (asking whether the Supreme Court's
reliance on Colony in Home Concrete "in the face of Regulations" is consistent with
BrandXbecause "Colony was actually interpreting an unambiguous statute[]"); BrandXj
545 U.S. at 982.
196. See supraPart III.C.
197. See generally Home Concrete, 634 F.3d at 254-55 (discussing the relationship
between the trade and business exception and Colony).
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determination of statutory ambiguity under BrandX.198 The Court would
have thus avoided the internal disagreement over the Brand X question,
which is evidenced by Home Concrete's plurality, concurrence, and
dissent. 199 If the Supreme Court confronts a similar question, it could
distinguish the prior determination of statutory ambiguity before
reaching the Brand X question. Such a holding will achieve two
objectives. First, it will provide a standard that will result in circuit court
decision constituency when applying Brand X. 200 Second, the holding
will ensure that the spirit of Chevron is followed by granting
administrative agencies, including the Treasury, deference in their area
of expertise.2 °1
Limiting the extent of judicial precedent in a Brand X inquiry will
produce consistent results. 20 2 Conversely, any test that requires a court
to reclassify holdings from prior cases would be "fraught with
difficulties. 2 3
Courts would be able to avoid the question of
precedential value of the prior judicial determination of statutory
ambiguity if they limit the application of a decision in its entirety.20 4
The second advantage of clarifying that a court is only narrowly
bound to a prior determination of statutory ambiguity is that the standard
will continue the Chevron spirit of administrative deference.20 5 In
Chevron, the Supreme Court reasoned: similar to how Congress is better
suited than the courts in making policy, administrative agencies are
better suited than the courts at interpreting statutes in accordance with
policy.206 Brand X reaffirmed Chevron and created a deferential
approach to resolving judicial conflicts of an agency's statutory
interpretation.2 7 Subsequently, Mayo Foundationbrought TR deference
within the Chevron framework, eliminating the less deferential National
Muffler standard.20 8
In the wake of the Supreme Court's
198. See Brief for United States, United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, 132 S.
Ct. 1836 (2012) (No. 11-139), 2011 WL 5591822, at *46 ("In enacting subparagraph (i),
by contrast, Congress established a special definition of gross income that applies only in
the case of a trade or business.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
199. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S.Ct 1836, 1843-52

(2011).
200. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 121, at 18.
201. See Craig, supra note 31, at 18.
202. See Administrative Law, supra note 32, at 1072 ("The problem of reexamination,
of course, would exist under any regime that mandated recategorization of past statutory
interpretation.").
203. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 121, at 918-19.
204. See id.
205. See Craig, supra note 31, at 18.
206. See Murphy, supra note 125, at 865-66.
207. See Administrative Law, supranote 32, at 1070 (2011).
208. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 704, 713
(2011).
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acknowledgement in Mayo Foundationthat the Treasury deserves a high
level deference to its regulations, the circuit courts have disagreed on
how far that deference should go. 209 The Supreme Court's jurisprudence
has continually reaffirmed administration deference. 2 10 By holding that a
pre-Chevron determination of statutory ambiguity should be limited as
narrowly as possible, the Supreme Court will adhere to its continuing
deferential jurisprudence.2 1
Although limiting precedent is preferable, it is admittedly
problematic. On one hand, Colony is binding within the trade or
business context because Colony declared Section 6501 to be
unambiguous.212 On the other hand, Colony is not binding outside the
trade or business context because Section 6501 is ambiguous."' This
divergence is an intellectual conundrum because courts will be holding
the statute ambiguous in one context and unambiguous in another.21 4
However, by limiting the precedential nature of a prior determination of
statutory ambiguity, rather than delving into Brand X, courts will
produce consistent results and will be faithful to Chevron deference.21 5
IV. CONCLUSION

Regulation by administrative agencies is an essential part of
interpreting vague statutes.21 6 If there is ambiguity in a law, Congress
permits agencies to resolve the ambiguity. 21 7 Agency interpretation,
however, is checked when courts use the Chevron framework to
determine the scope and reasonableness of regulation.2 18
209. Compare Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249 (4th
Cir. 2011) (acknowledging Mayo Foundation,but declining to defer to the Section 6501
TRs), affd, 132 S. Ct 1836 (2011), with Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Comm'r (Salman Ranch
IV), 647 F.3d 929 (10th Cir. 2011) (deferring to the Section 6501 TRs).
210. See, e.g., Mayo Found, 131 S. Ct. at 713 (reaffirming Chevron by extending the
doctrine to TR deference).
211. See Craig, supra note 31, at 18.
212. See Colony, Inc. v. Comm'r, 357 U.S. 28, 37 (1958).
213. See, e.g., Salman Ranch IV, 647 F.3d at 938 ("While the Partnership is correct
that the Court later referred to the updated § 6501(e)(1)(A) (1954) as 'unambiguous,' ...
we do not read that analysis as extending beyond the trade-or-business context.").
214. See Carpenter Family Invs., LLC. v. Comm'r, 136 T.C. 373, 381 (2011) ("If the
Colony holding has been statutorily confined to a trade or business context, it cannot any
longer constitute the Supreme Court's interpretation of current Section 6501.
Conversely, if Colony represents the Supreme Court's own construction of this text, the
holding must necessarily extend beyond just trade or business.").
215. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 121, at 918-19.
216. See Roche, supra note 3, at 263.
217. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2006) (granting the Treasury general interpretive
authority over the I.R.C.).
218. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84243(1984).
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Congress bestowed vast regulatory authority to the Treasury to
interpret the I.R.C. 21 9 Although the power is legitimately used to prevent
the abuse of tax shelters, Congress has limited the Treasury's power by
imposing SOLs on the time the agency has to recoup deficiencies. 220 But
when judicial precedent and agency interpretation conflict over the
meaning of a statute, the taxpayer must take the risk that his action might
go unnoticed, or incur expenses defending his return to sort out the
conflict between the judiciary and the agency. 1
The BrandX test attempts to determine when a pre-existing judicial
determination of statutory ambiguity binds a court, rather than allowing
deference to agency regulation. 2
However, the circuit split over
Section 6501 demonstrated the fallibility of Brand X.223 Two circuits
decided to follow Colony in all contexts, holding that they were bound
224
by Colony's determination that Section 6501 was ambiguous.
Conversely, three circuits decided that they were not bound by Colony
because the case represented one of many reasonable interpretations of
the statute. 225 Although the Supreme Court attempted to avoid the Brand
X question by purportedly basing its decision on stare decisis, the Court
allowed the Brand X confusion to continue by implicitly deciding that
Colony was unambiguous and controlling.26
If the Supreme Court reconsiders the issue of whether a prior
determination of statutory ambiguity is binding, the Court should rule to
limit the effect of precedent. 227 Limiting a pre-existing determination of
statutory ambiguity to the narrowest grounds possible and distinguishing

219. See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2006).
220. See Roche, supra note 3, at 263; I.R.C. § 6501(e)(1)(A) (2006).
221. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 22-23, United States v. Home Concrete &
Supply, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012) (No. 11-139) (Breyer, J.: "Then look at the unfairness of
[the Section 6501 TRs] ... people spent a lot of money [defending their payment] ....
And then ... after continuous litigation, the IRS promulgates a regulation which tries to
reach back and capture people who filed their return 9 years before.").
222. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
982 (2005).
223. See Administrative Law, supra note 32, at 1066-67 (using the Section 6501
circuit split to argue for a new BrandX framework).
224. See Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347, 360 (5th Cir. 2011); Home Concrete &
Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d 249, 257 (4th Cir. 2011), aft'd, 132 S. Ct 1836
(2011).
225. See Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2011); Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Comm'r (Salman Ranch IV), 647 F.3d 929, 940 (10th Cir.
2011); Intermountain Ins. Servs. of Vail v. Comm'r, 650 F.3d 691, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
226. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1843 (2011).
227. In the alternative, the Court could overturn Brand X and eliminate this
unnecessary wrinkle in Chevron jurisprudence, as advocated by Scalia's concurring
opinion in Home Concrete. See Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1848 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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in favor of agency regulation will avoid Brand X, yielding consistent
results in lower courts that remain faithful to Chevron deference.228
This analysis of the Section 6501 split has provided an answer to
the Brand X problem: when subsequent cases cannot be distinguished,
stare decisis should rule the day; but, when subsequent cases can be
distinguished, a court should limit pre-existing determinations of
statutory ambiguity narrowly and allow agencies to regulate.

228.

See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 121, at 918-19; Craig, supra note 31, at 18.

